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The Role and Work 
of Bomber Command 
A note by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris for the Prime 
Minister and War Cabinet, prepared at the request of the 
Prime Minister, 28th June 1942 
Editor's Note: Few senior Allied Commanders have been criticized as strongly as Air Marshal Sir 
Arthur Harris. And even those critics who recognize the vital contribution Harris and Bomber 
Command made to the defeat of Nazi Gennany are disturbed by the tone of Harris' letters to 
Churchill and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal. Harris never wavered in his conviction that 
Germany could be defeated by strategic bombing with ground troops assigned to a secondary 
role. This view underlay his arguments for assigning priority to strategic bombing. In pursuing 
the case Harris mixed careful argument and clear logic with emotional attacks on those who 
doubted his doctrines. The following note, written shortly qfter Harris assumed command, displays 
Harris at his best, arguing the case for Bomber Command "as the only means qfbringing assistance 
to Russia in time" and the only means "which will make subsequent invasion a possible proposition." 
1. Those who advocate the breaking-up of 
Bomber Command for the purpose of adding 
strength to Coastal and Army Co-operation 
Commands and overseas requirements are like 
the amateur politician who imagines that the 
millennium will arrive through the simple process 
of dividing available cash equally between all. 
Ignorance of what is available for distribution is 
such that he does not realise that the outcome 
would be to give every individual £50 once at the 
cost of wrecking the entire industrial organisation 
and income of the country. Similarly, if the 
Medium and Heavy Bomber Operational 
Squadrons of Bomber Command were 
distributed between the many claimants for 
favour on the one hand, none of these claimants 
would receive anything more than a mere morsel 
towards the satisfaction of their alleged 
requirements. On the other hand, our only 
offensive weapon against Germany would be 
destroyed. One cannot win wars by defending 
oneself. The defensive use of offensive weapons 
must therefore be reduced to the irreducible 
minimum necessary to survival. 
2. There is surprising ignorance about the 
effective strength of Bomber Command. On an 
average, it is able to produce about 30 operational 
medium and heavy night bomber squadrons and 
siX light bomber squadrons, the latter with no 
reserves of aircraft behind them. The firstline 
strength of the operational squadrons of Bomber 
Command represents no more than 11 per cent 
ofthe total operational first-line strength of the 
Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm, and well over 
half of the effort of this 11 per cent is directed 
against Naval and Military targets. 
3. People often point to the vast training 
organisation behind Bomber Command. It is truly 
and necessarily great. What such people fail to 
realise, however, is that the Bomber Command 
training organisation provides the whole 
requirements for reinforcing all the bomber forces 
overseas and much else besides. At present, for 
instance, it provides 148 pilots per month for 
overseas bomber squadrons, including 95 
complete crews. In the past this quota has at times 
been even higher. In addition to this monthly 
output for overseas requirements, Bomber 
Command has trained, equipped, and then given 
away or lent to Coastal and Overseas Commands 
and other claimants, 24 squadrons in the last 
year. It also provides the crews of 2 squadrons 
employed on special S.O.E. and S.I.S. duties, and 
crews to man a great number of experimental and 
special training units, which work for all 
Commands, at home and overseas. Finally, it is 
required from time to time to find from 300 to 
400 operational aircraft in order to make up the 
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1 ,000 or so required to carry out specially heavy 
attacks against objectives of major importance. 
4. Another common error is to suppose that the 
effort of the Command is devoted to the bombing 
of targets in Germany remote from and chosen 
without reference to the general military and naval 
situation. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Approximately 50 per cent of the total operational 
effort of Bomber Command during the twelve 
months April 1941-March 1942 was directly 
employed against the enemy's sea power. During 
the last three months the proportion has been 
well over 50 per cent. All the remaining efforts of 
Bomber Command have great direct effect on the 
Naval and Land war situations as a whole. 
5. For all practical purposes the squadrons of 
Bomber Command have done almost all the air-
sea mining throughout the War. They have laid 
some 2,000 odd mines from the beginning of the 
War to December 1941, which accounted for one 
known enemy ship per 26.2 mines (it can be 
reasonably assumed that at least one unknown 
ship was sunk or damaged for every known one). 
The Command has enormously increased its 
mining efforts since the beginning of March this 
year. It is now laying mines at the rate of over a 
thousand a month, and already the reports on 
sinkings are greatly increased over anything 
previously achieved. Amongst particular mining 
successes can be counted the closing of the Kiel 
Canal to heavy enemy ships for some four months 
and the damaging and sinking of several of the 
highly specialised Baltic train ferries and 
icebreaker ferries on which the enemy is 
peculiarly dependent. Also, the sinking by mining 
and bombing, according to the evidence from 
German wreck charts, of something over 300 
enemy-employed ships, and damage to a large 
number more. The mining of both Scharnhorst 
and Gneisenau, and also other enemy war vessels 
and troop transports, some of which are known 
to have resulted in great loss oflife, must also be 
taken into account. 
6. The story of the Scharnhorst and the 
Gneisenau is perhaps an outstanding incident 
of the vast effect of the small Bomber Command 
force on the Naval war. These two ships, on their 
one and only raid into the Atlantic, did appalling 
damage to our shipping, sinking no fewer than 
19vessels, totalling 150,000tons. Theyretumed 
to Brest to refuel and tum round prior to repeated 
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forays, but since that date, over fifteen months 
ago, and almost entirely due to the efforts of 
Bomber Command, they have never been able to 
sink another British or Allied ship. They have only 
just been able to escape and stagger home, both 
of them striking air-laid mines on their return 
journey. Since their arrival in Kiel for repair, 
Scharnhorst is known to have been further hit 
and heavily damaged. Gneisenau has been so 
heavily hit and damaged by bombs that she has 
been taken away to Gdynia and largely 
dismantled. There are circumstantial reports that 
it has been decided to abandon repair on her. 
Prinz Eugen was also hit at Brest by Bomber 
Command. The direct result of the damage to 
these important ships is that throughout the war 
the German Fleet has never been able to operate 
as an entity, with all that that implies. It was 
directly due to the immobilisation of Scharnhorst 
and Gneisenau that Bismarck essayed her lone 
raid in the Atlantic and to that fact can be largely 
credited her subsequent destruction. To Bomber 
Command, therefore, can also largely be credited 
the fact that Tirpitz in her turn is now a lone wolf. 
7. Additional and direct effects on the war 
efficiency of the German Fleet arising from the 
efforts of Bomber Command are as follows: 
(i) The main enemy Naval base at Kiel has 
been repeatedly and very heavily damaged by 
bomber attacks. A large number of workshops 
have been destroyed and the dockyard workers' 
quarters have received vast damage, with all 
that that implies in regard to delay in Naval 
supply and repair work. 
(ii) Amongst other instances the depot ship 
Monte Olivia was bombed and burnt out, with 
reported heavy loss of life to submarine ratings 
and some of Gneisenau's crew who were living 
on board. 
(iii) There is no doubt that the morale of 
enemy Naval personnel, who largely come from 
the German coastal ports, has been seriously 
affected by the heavy damage, and the raid-fear 
inflicted on these ports and their populace. 
8. The six light bomber squadrons of Bomber 
Command are responsible for the close support 
of the Army in the event of invasion, or in the 
event of the Army proceeding overseas. They 
provide the bait for Fighter Command without 
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which the fighter sweeps would be ineffective, 
because the enemy often refuses battle unless 
bombers are present. They also provided the 
detachments at Malta which so successfully 
attacked the enemy's lines of communication. 
They are known to have sunk some 51,000 tons 
of enemy shipping on that supply line. By direct 
bomber attack in European waters, these light 
bomber squadrons have sunk some 250,000 
tons, seriously damaged 287,000 tons and 
damaged a further 380,000 tons. 
9. The effects on the enemy's submarine 
activities have been equally important. It is known 
that repeated interference with submarine crew 
training resulted from our mine laying in the 
Baltic and the Bight. It is known that, from time 
to time, considerable damage has been done to 
submarine building yards at Hamburg, Kiel, 
Rostock, Emden and other ports. Heavy damage 
has been done to the three main submarine Diesel 
engine factories at Augsburg, Deutz, and the 
Germania yards at Kiel. Damage has also been 
done to one of the two main submarine 
accumulator factories. In addition, the 
widespread damage done to German industry by 
Bomber Command, perhaps especially in 
Cologne, must have profoundly affected the 
submarine campaign. It is known that, at the 
submarine building yard at Le Trait, three 
submarines under construction were reported 
destroyed and between 150 and 200 workmen 
employed on them were killed. 
10. It can also be safely assumed that damage 
has been inflicted on submarines operating from 
the French West Coast ports. Although the actual 
cause of loss of a submarine which does not 
return can seldom be determined, the known 
losses inflicted on German shipping remove any 
shadow of doubt that some losses, possibly 
considerable losses, have been inflicted on the 
enemy submarine fleet by Bomber Command's 
minelaying. 
11. By smashing up the invasion ports and the 
invasion barges and shipping concentrations, 
there is little doubt that Bomber Command had 
impressed upon the enemy the difficulties, if not 
the impossibility, of invasion. Indeed, history may 
yet show that invasion was prevented by the 
Command. It certainly can be if it is attempted in 
future. 
llO 
12. The known results of the bombing raids on 
Germany show that they cause vast destruction 
and vast embarrassment to the enemy. It would 
not be possible in a note to detail a tithe of the 
known immense damage occasioned in Germany. 
Whilst it takes approximately some 7,000 hours 
of flying to destroy one submarine at sea, that 
was approximately the amount of flying necessary 
to destroy one-third of Cologne, the third largest 
city in Germany, in one night, a town of vast 
industrial import. 250 of its factories were 
damaged or destroyed. This must have gravely 
embarrassed the enemy war effort in every 
direction. The towns of Rostock, Lubeck, Emden 
and Cologne have all been destroyed to or beyond 
the point where they can be counted as a liability 
rather than an asset to the enemy. The very heavy 
damage to the Heinkel Aircraft Factory at Rostock 
is known to have gravely affected the Heinkel 
output, and is reported to have had the most 
serious effect on the enemy's air war on all fronts, 
and also at sea. The Focke Wulfworks at Bremen 
have also been very seriously damaged. 
13. The destruction of the Renault Factory might 
be counted as an astounding achievement of 
Bomber Command. Achieved in a few hours with 
practically no loss it is clearly a major victory 
against the enemy's land forces such as no other 
of our forces has yet achieved. Through the loss 
ofthis factory and the Matford works at Poissy, 
the enemy is known, according to the Ministry of 
Economic Warfare, to have been permanently 
deprived of the armoured fighting vehicles and 
transport equipment sufficient for the formation 
and maintenance of 10/11 motorised divisions. 
The important enemy aircraft factories at 
Gennevilliers and Salmsons have been destroyed. 
The Goodrich rubber factory, and the Thomson 
Houston and Ericsson Electrical gear factory have 
also been destroyed, and 16 neighbouring 
factories damaged, some "on a tremendous scale." 
(Interpretation Report.) 
14. One of Germany's most pressing problems 
is to maintain her system of internal transport. 
The German Transport Minister recently stated 
that, unless the problem of improving the 
transport facilities inside Germany were solved, 
Germany's victory would be imperilled. He said 
that in the western and north-western regions of 
Germany, where frequent bombing raids had 
taken place, the transport service was carried out 
under extremely difficult conditions. An 
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additional strain is thrown upon the railways by 
the diversion of traffic caused by sea-mining, while 
the bombing of ports and industrial towns has 
been shown to do much incidental damage to the 
transport services. It is known that the internal 
transport system has recently been put under the 
control of the German Minister responsible for 
armaments production and that very high 
priorities, which must interfere with other 
production, have been given to locomotive and 
wagon construction, and repair. Concomitant with 
this declaration by the Reich Minister, Bomber 
Command virtually destroyed the important 
rolling-stock works at Cologne and severely 
damaged another such works at Bremen. 
15. To the negative, but very worthwhile, credit 
of Bomber Command can be counted the strain 
upon the enemy of maintaining an enormous and 
ever-increasing mine-sweeping effort, and also the 
establishment and maintenance of the largest 
anti-aircraft and A.R.P. organisation in the world. 
Some three-quarters of a million personnel are 
employed on anti-aircraft duties in Germany. If 
one adds to that the A.R.P. services, the damage 
and repair organisation and the manufacture of 
guns and their anti-aircraft ammunition, and also 
the mine-sweeping and mined ship repairing 
organisation, there is little doubt that the very 
existence of Bomber Command costs the enemy 
the whole-time services of at least three million 
able-bodied personnel. In addition, Bomber 
Command forces the enemy to maintain a large 
and rapidly increasing force of night fighters, 
which now amounts to some 300 aircraft. Many 
of these are Ju.88's, a type which, if released, 
could be used effectively for the attack of our 
shipping. There is no doubt that, if the Bomber 
policy was to be abandoned, the release of this 
vast manpower for other essential work would 
be of the greatest value to Germany. The release 
of the twin-engine fighter bombers and the anti-
aircraft guns for service on the eastern front and 
in the Mediterranean would have a powerful and 
perhaps even a decisive effect on those campaigns. 
16. The purely defensive use of air power is 
grossly wasteful. The Naval employment of 
aircraft consists of picking at the fringes of enemy 
power, of waiting for opportunities that may never 
occur, and indeed probably never will occur, of 
looking for needles in a haystack. They attempt 
to sever each capillary vein, one by one, when they 
could, with much less effort, cut the artery. 
Bomber Command attacks the sources of all 
Naval power, rather than the fringes of the one 
type of enemy Naval operation which obviously 
menaces us - the submarine. An outstanding 
example of waste of air effort is the taking away 
from Bomber Command of all the Hampden 
aircraft for conversion to torpedo bombers for 
the defence of this country. These squadrons have, 
for more than two years, exercised continuous 
and direct pressure on Germany. Since allocation 
to Coastal Command they have done practically 
nothing. It is within the bounds of possibility that 
they will never get an opportunity to achieve 
anything. The enemy is not such a fool as to flaunt 
valuable ships within reach of shore-based 
aircraft otherwise than when compelled by 
circumstances to do so, and then only on his own 
terms as to weather and fighter cover. 
17. To sum up, Bomber Command provides our 
only offensive action yet pressed home directly 
against Germany. All our other efforts are 
defensive in their nature, and are not intended to 
do more, and can never do more, than enable us 
to exist in the face of the enemy. Bomber 
Command provides the only means of bringing 
assistance to Russia in time. The only means of 
physically weakening and nervously exhausting 
Germany to an extent which will make subsequent 
invasion a possible proposition, and is therefore 
the only force which can, in fact, hurt our enemy 
in the present or in the future secure our victory. 
It is the only type of force which we shall ever be 
able to bring directly against Japan. 
18. Finally, it is apparent that an extraordinary 
lack of sense of proportion affects outside 
appreciation of the meaning, extent and results 
of Bomber Command's operations. What shouts 
of victory would arise if a Commando wrecked 
the entire Renault factory in a night, with a loss 
of seven men! What credible assumptions of an 
early end to the war would follow upon the 
destruction of a third of Cologne in an hour and 
a half by some swift moving mechanised force 
which, with but 200 casualties, withdrew and was 
ready to repeat the operation 24 hours later! What 
acclaim would greet the virtual destruction of 
Rostock and the Heinkel main and subsidiary 
factories by a Naval bombardment! All this, and 
far more, has been achieved by Bomber 
Command; yet there are many who still avert their 
gaze, pass by on the other side, and question 
whether the 30 Squadrons of night bombers make 
any worth-while contribution to the war. 
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When in 1914 Hamilton Gault, at 
his own expense, raised Princess 
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 
to fight for the Crown, his was not 
simply a splendid patriotic 
gesture - he bought himself a 
ticket to the war. Within nine 
days his new regiment was ready 
and was in action by the end of 
the year. Its fighting record was 
second to none. 
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manipulation and his to power using propaganda prepared by 
Joseph Goebbels and photographs approved by Hitler himself. 
Laffin's insistence that the West should not have been surprised 
by any of Hitler's actions will both disturb and compel the reader. 
$30.95 1-85753-103-5 9"x6"12Bpp i/lus. 
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